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Abstract: This paper investigates empirically the possibility of forming an Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA) among member countries of Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) region. Under OCA, member countries share a common 
currency (like, the Euro), while foregoing their autonomy with respect to their use of 
monetary policy instruments. We say that the countries are good candidates for forming 
an OCA if there is a long run relationship in the trend (permanent) component of output. 
Our results indicate existence of long run relationship in the trend component of GDP 
among the member countries in the ECOWAS region. Hence is the plausibility for 
forming an OCA. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite ongoing controversy over the hypothetical and empirical merits of 
regional trade agreements in and of themselves and in relation to global trade 
liberalization, over the last two decades, regional trade agreements have gained ever 
increased prominence. Around 230 regional trade agreements (RTAs), notified under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) are in force today.3 Rather than attempting to resolve the controversy regarding 
the merits of regional trade agreements, we have instead chosen to explore whether 
economic characteristics of the members of one such regional agreement, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), predispose the successful formation of 
an optimum currency area (OCA). ECOWAS was initiated in 1975, and includes Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, as members. 
ECOWAS is one of the largest single regional trade groups in Africa. The idea behind 
ECOWAS was initially to form a Free Trade Area (FTA) among the member States 
before moving towards higher types of regional integration in the form of Customs Union 
(CU), Common Markets (CM) and Economic Union (EU). 4 In fact, within ECOWAS 
region a monetary union was formed on January 10 1994. Known as the Union 
Economique Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), or West African Economic and 
Monetary Union, it has Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo, as its member. UEMOA with its well built institutional and 
organizational structure is one of the advanced integration scheme in Africa. The rest of 
the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines characteristics that are considered 
to be ideal for any RTA to sustain and flourish (read, increase income in the region 
through rise in trade resulting from RTA). Section 3 deals with the empirical 
methodology that we use to examine the hypothesis, which is – how well countries in 
ECOWAS, and within ECOWAS, the UEMOA region have the desirable characteristics 
to form a RTA. Section 4 interprets the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with some 
policy recommendations. 
 
2. ECOWAS as a RTA   
From the welfare perspective becoming part of any RTA is desirable if trade 
creation effect resulting from the country joining the RTA outweigh the trade diversion 
effect. Trade creation happens when more efficient producer of one country displace the 
less efficient producers of another member country within Free Trade Area (FTA). On 
the other hand trade diversion results in displacement of more efficient producers outside 
FTA - losing market share to less efficient producers within FTA. Unfortunately, many 
                                                 
3 Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm Accessed: 7/23/2009.  
4 In forming, a FTA, members remove trade barriers among themselves but keep their separate national 
barriers against trade with outside nations. In a CU, members not only remove trade barriers among 
themselves but also adopt a common set of external barriers. In a CM, members allow full freedom of 
factor flows (migration of labour and capital) among themselves in addition to having a CU. In an EU, 
members unify all their economic policies, including monetary, fiscal and welfare policies, while retaining 
the features of a CM. An OCA is a special type of EU where the countries operate with a single currency.  
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times it becomes difficult to measure the exact nature of gains and losses, and hence 
economists based their comments about the desirability of member countries forming a 
RTA on the basis of some metrics. Some of these criteria are considered below-   
 
2.1 Country characteristics:  
 
Member countries are likely to gain if they share similar economic characteristics 
(Lumsdaine and Prasad, 2002). Similarities are measured in terms of economic 
development and geographical proximities. The more similar are the economies, the more 
is the likelihood of intra-industry trade. Similarity is often measured in terms of per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP). This is because geographically near economies 
with similar level of economic development have access to similar kind of technology. 
Consequently they tend to produce more or less similar items and tend to trade in similar 
commodities (closely differentiated products as in the monopolistic competition type 
market structure).  
 
2.2 Symmetric Economic Activities:   
  
 Symmetric economic activities among member nations have complementary 
effect towards forging for deeper economic integration, like, custom and economic union. 
Symmetric economic activity implies that long-run movements in real output are 
synchronized. Such co-movements of outputs may be due to dependence of common 
factors such as geographical proximity and countries sharing similar industrial profile. 
When countries share a similar industrial profile and are located closely, then the demand 
shocks in one country may affect other countries in the region. Symmetry in economic 
activity implies that there is a lesser contradiction in terms of formulating internal and 
external macroeconomic policies – something which is prerequisite for forming a deeper 
economic integration.   
 
2.3 Extent of Trade:  
 
 If the country is more likely to trade with other member countries in the RTA, 
then it makes sense to join that RTA. In fact, RTA is more likely to happen when trade 
happens in similar commodities, that is, intra-industry trade, like Japan exporting Toyota 
cars to the US, and at the same time importing Ford cars from the US. The likelihood that 
industry association will demand more protection is less in case of intra-industry trade.  
 
 Against this background, we analyze how well the countries in the ECOWAS 
region, UEMOA regions (a subset of ECOWAS region), and non-UEMOA region (other 
countries in the ECOWAS region sans UEMOA member countries), fulfill these 
desirable criteria. We carry out this analysis under three broad headings- 
 
2.4 Economic Characteristics of ECOWAS Nations:  
 
When observed in terms of economic characteristics, countries in the ECOWAS 
region are generally similar in terms of - (a) per capita income – predominantly less 
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developed countries with annual per capita income well below $1000; (b) percentage of 
population living in rural areas; (c) demographic profile - very few percentage of the 
population belongs to the group aging 65 and above; (d) value addition of industrial 
sector to national income, which constitutes roughly a fourth of GDP in most member 
countries; and (e) development indicators measured in terms of fertility rate (total births 
per woman), and infant mortality rates. Except for few outliers, like, Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, and Sierra Leone, saving as proportion of GDP are also similar across these 
economies. The other thing that we observed is that within the ECOWAS region, 
countries that are part of UEMOA seem to be more homogenous relative to non-UEMOA 
group of countries. For any particular variable, we measure similarity or dissimilarity 
across countries in terms of first two moment conditions – mean, standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation, that is, ratio of standard deviation over mean (See Table 1a).  
Now let us comment about the factors such as, inflation rates, fiscal deficit, 
external debt and level of tariffs; that might affect the value of exchange rates. A stable 
exchange rate in the region is desirable before group of countries contemplate about 
entering into an economic union. Greater variation in macroeconomic variables of the 
member nations will have an impact in terms of reducing efficiency of any common 
demand and exchange rates management policy. 
For instance, if few member countries experience high inflation rates, whereas, 
the majority others experience recession; then an expansionary demand management 
policy is actually going to aggravate situation for the high inflation countries.        
It is, therefore, essential to examine economic fundamentals of any aspirant 
country before it is allowed to become part of any monetary union. This is because a 
country with higher inflation rates might have other consequences. It will see a fall in the 
value of its domestic exchange rates. If this country is operating under a fixed exchange 
rate regimes where the value of its currency is pegged to French franc (say), a 
continuation of domestic inflation rates will imply the relative market price of domestic 
currency will fall against the French franc. In this event, any effort to prevent value of 
domestic currency from falling further will require Central Bank of this country to raise 
domestic interest rates. A rise in domestic interest rate is seen as a measure to attract 
foreign funds. However, rise in domestic interest rates also mean a fall in domestic 
investment and domestic consumption, which might eventually push this economy 
towards recession. This is what has exactly happened in case of Thailand during the 
South East Asian crisis.  
Similarly, in an event of fixed exchange rates a higher external debt implies 
plausibility about domestic currency running into speculative attacks. This might 
eventually lead to massive devaluation of the domestic currency. Tariff might affect 
exchange rate in a different way. Other things remaining equal, under flexible exchange 
rate regimes, a lower tariff implies an increase in demand for imports, that is, a relative 
increase in demand for foreign currencies. However, recent literatures have suggested 
that tariffs measures are highly correlated with other non-tariff measures, and hence 
change in tariff levels have little impact in affecting value of exchange rates (Goldberg 
and Pavcnik, 2004). 
To sum up, if we are to go by these aforementioned variables that might in any 
way affect exchange rates in the ECOWAS regions then it seems except for small 
aberration (like, Guinea with high inflation rates and high current account deficit) other 
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member countries have a lesser variation in terms of their economic fundamentals. In 
general, ECOWAS region seems to have similar economic characteristics. When 
countries share similar type of economic characteristics, it indicates a lower pressure to 
transfer funds from relatively resourceful countries to the poorer ones and hence a greater 
harmony in following a common fiscal and monetary policy – an indication for deeper 
economic integration. 
 
Table 1a: Economic Characteristics in the ECOWAS region 
Economic 
Characteristics 
Annual Per 
Capita 
GDP (in US 
$) 
Population 
ages 15-64 
(% of total)  
Population 
ages 65 
and above 
(% of total)  
Mortality 
rate, infant 
(per 1,000 
live births)  
Fertility rate, total 
(births per 
woman)  
Agriculture, 
value added 
(% of GDP)  
UEMOA Region 
Benin 709 53.34 2.70 87.80 5.51 N/A
Burkina Faso 492 50.96 3.06 121.60 6.08 30.67
Cote d'Ivoire 1057 55.41 3.20 89.60 4.58 22.68
Guinea-Bissau 213 49.43 3.00 119.25 7.08 61.76
Mali 531 48.79 3.58 119.20 6.55 36.91
Niger 313 48.84 3.18 148.20 7.00 N/A
Senegal 915 53.82 4.26 59.90 5.30 15.87
Togo 387 53.90 3.08 69.15 4.91 N/A
Standard Deviation 295.12 2.619 0.472 30.04 0.947 1.902
Mean 558.28 51.81 3.257 101.83 5.876 17.65
Coefficient of 
Variation 
0.528 0.050 0.145 0.295 0.161 1.902
Non-UEMOA 
Cape Verde 2925 56.80 4.21 25.00 3.45 9.09
Gambia, The 405 55.22 3.78 84.00 4.79 N/A
Ghana 690 57.74 3.66 75.95 3.95 37.39
Guinea 417 53.66 3.09 98.05 5.52 12.94
Liberia 196 50.80 2.18 157.00 6.78 N/A
Nigeria 1161 52.97 2.94 98.60 5.43 N/A
Sierra Leone 290 53.85 3.31 159.20 6.48 46.38
Standard Deviation 961.96 18.15 1.19 52.50 2.025 26.45
Mean 869.14 48.100 2.952 88.881 4.715 18.264
Coefficient of 
Variation 
1.10 0.377 0.405 0.590 0.429 1.448
Addendum Table 1a: Economic Characteristics (Continued) 
 Gross 
savings (% 
of GDP) 
FDI, net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
Industry, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
 
GDP 
growth 
(annual %)  
 
Rural population 
(% of total 
population) 
Inflation 
UEMOA Region 
Benin N/A 1.32 N/A 4.10 59.50 2.986567
Burkina Faso 5.90 0.42 20.61 6.39 81.30 -0.08914
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Cote d'Ivoire 14.46 1.79 26.32 0.85 54.56 5.00476
Guinea-Bissau 22.79 13.79 11.46 4.20 70.32 -0.54271
Mali 13.00 3.15 24.03 5.30 68.94 4.093471
Niger N/A 0.56 N/A 4.80 83.00 1.816013
Senegal 18.46 0.63 23.01 2.30 58.14 3.369305
Togo N/A 2.57 N/A 4.10 59.18 -1.90905
Standard Deviation 6.319 4.458 5.758 1.728 10.861 2.455
Mean 14.922 3.028 21.086 4.005 66.867 1.841
Coefficient of 
Variation 
0.4234 1.472 0.273 0.431 0.162 1.333
Non-UEMOA 
Cape Verde 27.63 10.72 16.86 6.09 41.96 5.187737
Gambia, The 10.03 16.07 N/A 4.50 45.26 2.119709
Ghana 27.24 3.37 25.38 6.20 51.46 12.72414
Guinea 8.49 3.26 37.48 2.82 66.54 37.39349
Liberia N/A -12.95 N/A 7.80 41.22 9.152292
Nigeria 33.88 4.72 N/A 5.20 51.00 4.80831
Sierra Leone 9.50 4.05 24.99 7.37 58.56 11.6142
Standard Deviation 11.346 8.938 8.497 1.711 9.210 11.896
Mean 19.461 4.177 26.177 5.711 50.857 11.857
Coefficient of 
Variation 
0.583 2.139 0.324 0.299 0.181 1.003
Table 1b: Macro and External Sector Variables  
 Fiscal 
Balance 
(Surplus+ 
/ Deficit – 
as a % of 
GDP 
Current 
Account 
Balance
(In millions 
of US $)
Exchange 
Rates 
(National 
Currency
/US$)
Total 
Public 
External 
Debt as a 
% of 
GDP! 
Average 
Applied Tariff 
(Manufactured 
Items) !
Average 
Applied 
Tariff 
(Ores 
and 
Metals) !
UEMOA Region 
Benin -2 -300 445.59 16.5 12.1 7.4
Burkina Faso -6 -954 445.59 17.7 12.1 7.4
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3 798 445.59 62.3 -- --
Guinea-Bissau -17.3 -44 445.59 225.6 12.1 7.4
Mali -1.0 -383 445.59 22.7 12.1 7.4
Niger -0.8 -300 445.59 19.6 12.1 7.4
Senegal -5.5 -888 445.59 18.5 12.1 7.4
Togo -2.5 -152 445.59 70.5 12.1 7.4
Standard Deviation 5.683 543.727 0 71.591 0 0
Mean -4.35 -277.875 445.59 56.675 12.1 7.4
Coefficient of 
Variation -1.306 -1.956 0 1.2631 0 0
Non-UEMOA 
Cape Verde -2.3 798 74.90 44.1 -- --
Gambia, The 0.3 -83 22.53 135.6 -- --
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Ghana 1.8 -1033 0.97 14.9 -- --
Guinea -8.2 -396 4346.80 105.6 -- --
Liberia 1.5 -147 42.75 181.6 -- --
Nigeria 5.6 5129 109.55 2.6 12.1 7.4
Sierra Leone -2.5 -104 1666.67 92.9 -- --
Standard Deviation 4.35 2070.81 1637.41 65.460 0 0
Mean -0.54 594.85 894.88 82.47 12.1 7.4
Coefficient of 
Variation -8.017 3.4811 1.8297 0.7937 0 0
Note: All the figures are for the year 2007.  
! 2006 figures.  
Source: World Bank (2008) and African Union Commission (2008) 
 
Although going by the aforementioned characteristics there are more similarities 
relative to dissimilarities, we find the extents of trade among various RTAs in Africa is 
low (See Table 2a). ECOWAS member countries trade in much greater amount with 
European Union relative to what they trade among themselves, and with other trading 
groups in Africa (See Table 2c). One reason for low value of trade among ECOWAS 
nations are because tradables primarily comprise of agricultural items (cocoa beans, 
timber, coffee, yarn, etc.) and extractive items in the form of natural resources, like, oil. 
Similar exports profile with respect to primary commodities discourages trade. Intra-
industry trade is likely to flourish for technology intensive closely differentiated 
commodities, like, automobiles and computers. Disintegration of production itself leads 
to more trade, as intermediate inputs cross borders several times during the 
manufacturing process (Feenstra 1998). For example, automobile parts and finished autos 
are both included in trade between the United States and Canada—something clearly 
missing in the present context. 
 
Table No 2a: Intra and Interregional trade (in million of US$) 
Exports to 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Africa 3511 4109 4535 6168 7371 8974 
AMU 105 132 152 189 168 232 
CEN-SAD 2334 3233 3163 4531 5688 6133 
COMESA 36 48 52 72 137 120 
EAC 6 5 5 21 14 13 
ECCAS 417 399 699 732 934 1189 
ECOWAS 2242 3136 3037 4366 5497 5957 
IGAD 4 3 4 6 53 10 
SADC 334 534 717 971 822 1731 
Import from       
Africa 3910 3746 4847 6722 8197 9213 
AMU 2217 267 265 356 476 584 
CEN-SAD 2969 2793 3623 5183 6463 7216 
COMESA 103 142 140 168 234 183 
EAC 14 23 35 40 48 59 
ECCAS 73 151 131 173 228 281 
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ECOWAS 2696 2478 3293 4719 5835 6538 
IGAD 20 31 35 52 45 56 
SADC 511 487 737 1012 1186 1314 
Table 2b: Percentage of  Import and Export in two regions 
  90-94 95-99 00-04 2005 2006 2007 
UEMOA 
Region 
34.23% 37.71% 32.27% 30.46% 29.99% 32.01% Import 
Non-UEMOA 65.77% 62.29% 67.73% 69.54% 70.01% 67.99% 
UEMOA 
Region 
24.52% 30.28% 24.18% 19.17% 19.22% 22.21% Export 
Non-UEMOA 75.48% 69.72% 75.82% 80.83% 80.78% 77.79% 
Table 2c: ECOWAS Trade with European Union (In Million US $) 
Countries Imports 
2000              2001               2002 
Exports 
2000               2001           2002 
   UEMOA Region 
Benin 205 202 359 15 20 40 
Burkina Faso 216 213 256 67 69 76 
Cote D’Ivoire 1047 1123 1272 1605 1685 2314 
Guinea Bissau 34 37 38 40 40 41 
Mali 260 363 351 130 158 158 
Niger 89 94 126 67 78 76 
Senegal 745 894 1126 322 331 365 
Togo 164 153 158 41 21 25 
Non-UEMOA 
Cape Verde 174 191 204 9 8 9 
The Gambia 120 84 87 4 5 7 
Ghana 1131 2183 612 1179 1215 1014 
Guinea 234 210 216 401 334 349 
Liberia 62 63 63 43 51 51 
Nigeria 3010 3095 3202 6212 4096 4026 
Sierra Leone 53 77 79 1 8 17 
Total 7544 8982 8149 10136 8119 8568 
Source: African Union Commission (2008), and ECOWAS handbook of International 
Trade, (2008). 
 
Another reason for low intra-ECOWAS trade is because of poor infrastructure in 
the region. As is evident from Table 3, the region is not well served by a good network of 
roads and railways, crucial for the movement of goods in the region. Only Nigeria and 
Cape Verde have somewhat more miles of paved road relative to unpaved roads. The 
railway network is highly fragmented, with very little addition has been made to the 
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existing network inherited from the colonial rule. In general, railway lines coverage as 
percentage of total surface area is less than 0.5 percent for most African countries, which 
is quite low when compared to some emerging economies in Asia. For example, railway 
lines coverage as a percentage of total surface area for China, India, South Korea and 
Vietnam are, 0.78, 1.92, 3.40, and 0.79 percent, respectively (World Development 
Indicators, 2008). Absence of proper road and rail connectivity with the urban market has 
implication on median income on rural household, as the latter group depends upon urban 
markets as an outlet for their produce. This has an important implication on regional 
income distribution. In addition, political and social conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea Bissau and Niger, has also prevented national governments to divert adequate 
funds for development of both physical and social infrastructures.   
 
Table 3: Roads and Railway Network in the ECOWAS Region 
 
 Paved 
Roads 
(miles) 
Unpaved 
Roads 
(miles)
Paved/Unpaved 
Ratio
Railways 
(Miles)
Railway Lines as a 
percentage of Total 
Surface Area
UEMOA Region 
Benin 2656 5604 0.46 578 0.51
Burkina Faso 2001 1050 0.19 622 0.23
Cote d'Ivoire 3579 42752 0.08 660 0.20
Guinea-Bissau 444 3906 0.11 None None
Mali 1773 13003 0.14 641 0.05
Niger 779 9084 0.08 None None
Senegal 4214 10366 0.4 904 0.46
Togo 2376 5143 0.46 525 0.92
Non-UEMOA 
Cape Verde 858 242 3.5 None None
Gambia  932 1708 0.55 None None
Ghana 9353 28208 0.33 953 0.40
Guinea 4964 25306 0.2 1086 0.44
Liberia 628 9652 0.06 490 0.44
Nigeria 26005 6100 4.26 3557 0.39
Sierra Leone 1284 10390 0.12 84 0.12
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – The World Factbook (Various Issues). 
 
The other factor that these West African countries need to figure about is how to 
ease labor mobility in the region. Because of language and institutional barriers presently 
labor mobility is low among the West African nations.  However, this is not a major 
reason for concern as it requires political willingness to ease movement of labors. Labor 
mobility will help to absorb any shocks arising from persistence of unemployment in any 
particular member States. Therefore to sustain the RTA in its present form there is a need 
to encourage greater flow of goods, services and labors, in the ECOWAS region.   
Finally, let us examine this hypothesis whether economic activities are symmetric. 
We based our analysis by examining how the key economic variable, namely the outputs 
of the ECOWAS member countries, respond to external shocks. We considered GDP as a 
proxy for output. Changes in the level of output over time are due to permanent and 
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transitory disturbances. There is a general consensus among macroeconomists that the 
transitory part of the GDP (also known as cycle) is of temporary in nature and is caused 
by demand shocks. The trend part of the GDP (also known as permanent component) is 
explained by supply shocks and is of permanent nature. In order to show synchronized 
movement in output we have to consider the permanent part of GDP and test whether 
there is any long term relation (read, cointegration) among them. The temporary part of 
GDP by definition is stationary and therefore cannot be tested for cointegration to 
ascertain presence of any long term relation.  
 
3. Methodology    
We use Beveridge-Nelson (1981) methodology to decompose the output data into 
its cyclical component and permanent component. Although vector autoregression (VAR) 
method as employed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) does a better job in terms of 
identifying structural shocks – demand and supply side shocks – in addition to identifying 
cyclical and permanent component of output, we stick to Beveridge Nelson methodology 
as unemployment data necessary to perform Blanchard and Quah decomposition are not 
available for the ECOWAS members. Beveridge and Nelson show that any ARIMA 
model can be represented as a stochastic trend plus a stationary component where a 
stochastic trend is defined to be random walk, possibly with a drift. For any data 
generating process ty , using Beveridge-Nelson methodology, we can decompose it as 
follows: 
s
t
p
tt yyy +=                         
where ∑
=
+=
t
r
r
p
t hty
1
εμ and tst Ldy ε)(=  
or t
p
t
p
t hyy εμ ++= −1         (2) 
p
ty  which is the permanent component, is a stochastic trend and is modeled as random 
walk with a drift μ . sty  is the stationary component and is a function of moving average 
components. The permanent and the stationary components of the time series are both 
proportional to the disturbance term tε  and are thus perfectly correlated. Beveridge and 
Nelson (1981) defined the permanent part as that part of ty  which will be continued into 
the future, whereas the temporary part is purely a stationary random process.  
 
3.1 Data  
We have GDP data for each country, namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ghana, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Guinea, Mali and Mauritania are excluded from the analysis as relevant data for all time 
periods for these countries are not available. The results of the analysis will not change 
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much as these countries are smaller economies, with, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana and 
Senegal being the largest economies. The data consisted of 48 annual observations from 
1960 to 2007. The data used in this study are real GDP data measured in current US 
dollars. The data is obtained from World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Gross Domestic Product∗ 
GDP! 
 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
UEMOA Region 
Benin 1.49 1.27 1.25 5.42 .226 
Burkina Faso 1.97 1.76 1.54 6.76 .330 
Cote d'Ivoire 7.59 8.39 5.14 19.57 .546 
Niger 1.66 1.80 .878 4.17 0.44 
Senegal 3.67 3.20 2.49 11.15 6.79 
Togo .979 .927 .642 2.49 .121 
Non-UEMOA 
Ghana 4.78 4.42 2.96 15.24 1.21 
Liberia .512 .431 .283 1.03 .132 
Nigeria 35.43 28.14 34.00 165.64 4.19 
Sierra Leone .755 .696 .322 1.67 .322 
∗ Measured in current US dollars. 
! Figures are in billions of US dollars. 
  Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
4. Interpretation of the Results 
The first step involves testing the data series for stationary. To test for 
nonstationarity, we used Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF). Using this test statistic, 
we found evidence of nonstationarity for the GDP.  The result of the ADF test in Table 5 
show that for all the sample countries data exhibit unit root, suggesting that these 
variables are not mean reverting but are I(1) processes. Specifically, we estimated the 
regression model  
∑
=
−− +Δ++=Δ
n
j
tjtjtt yyy
1
110 εαββ ,  
where, ty is the logarithm of the GDP series for each countries, and 1β  is the ADF 
parameter. To determine appropriate specification for the number of lagged GDP terms, 
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we use the standard lag-length diagnostic tests, such as AIC and Schwarz Criterion. The 
most parsimonious specification is obtained choosing a lag-length of n = 3. The partial t-
statistics on second and third-order lagged output were not statistically significant (P-
value>0.10). Loss functions, such as AIC and Schwarz Criterion, were roughly 
minimized in the neighborhood of n = 3. Given the MacKinnon (1996) critical values of 
2.61, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level of significance. 
Taking first difference of the data, we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% 
level of significance. Hence, the GDP data are non stationary.  
 
Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results 
Statistic / 
Diagnostic 
ben
ty  
bur
ty  
e
ty
cot gha
ty  
lib
ty
nig
ty
nige
ty
sen
ty  
sie
ty  
tog
ty  
ADF Test a 0.13 0.25 2.21 0.29 2.20 .458 1.03 .318 1.19 1.58 
AIC -1.28 -1.32 -1.33 -1.28 -0.66 -0.22 -1.27 -1.31 -0.55 -1.18 
Schwarz 
Criterian 
-1.20 -1.24 -1.25 -1.21 -0.54 -0.14 -1.15 -1.23 -0.48 -1.10 
Durbin 
Watson 
2.19 1.57 1.95 1.70 2.29 1.79 1.89 1.66 1.82 1.90 
Note: benty , 
bur
ty  
e
ty
cot gha
ty
lib
ty
nig
ty
nige
ty
sen
ty
sie
ty and 
tog
ty represent the natural logarithm of GDP 
of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  
aIn absolute value and compared to the MacKinnon (1991) critical value of 2.61 for a 10% level of 
significance. 
 
Having identified the data as non-stationary, we take the first difference of the 
level data series and make them stationary. The autocorrelation and the partial 
autocorrelation function of the first difference of the log of output ( ty ), for the ten 
countries were then examined. They were identified and estimated as an ARIMA process. 
The Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition is now applied to compute the 
permanent and the temporary component of ty . The results of the estimated model for 
each of the ten countries are summarized below5. 
UEMOA Region 
Benin 
Identification: ttt εεy +0.3055-0673.0=Δ 4-(2.076)(5.305)   
Solution: ( )321
1
0 3055.06945.00673.0 −−−
=
+++⋅++⋅+= ∑ ttttt
r
rt tyy εεεεε  
                                                 
5 Estimation was performed using the econometric software package EVIEWS 6. Let y be the name used 
for the series, log of real output, in a EVIEWS session. The ARIMA (1,1,1) model was estimated using the 
EVIEWS commands: y = c + AR(1) + MA(1).  
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Burkina Faso 
Identification: ttt εεy +850.0-0650.0=Δ 41-)73.24()6374.4(  
Solution: ( )1321
1
0 85.015.0065.0 −−−
=
++++⋅++⋅+= ∑ ttttt
r
rt tyy εεεεε LL  
Cote d'Ivoire  
Identification: ttt εyy +Δ3187.0+07511.0=Δ 1-)230.2()831.2(  
Solution: ∑
=
+⋅+=
t
r
rt tyy
1
0 4678.11103.0 ε  
Niger 
Identification: tttt εεyy +1275.0+Δ229.0+0476.0=Δ 1-)53.0(1-(0.29))84.1(  
Solution: t
t
r
rt tyy εε ⋅−+⋅+= ∑
=
1654.04624.10618.0
1
0  
Senegal 
Identification: ttt εεy +835.0+0619.0=Δ 11-)22.19()16.2(  
Solution: ( )1021
1
0 835.0835.10619.0 −−−
=
++++⋅−+⋅+= ∑ ttttt
r
rt tyy εεεεε LL  
Togo 
Identification: ttt εyy +Δ261.0+065.0=Δ 1-)79.1()41.2(  
Solution: ∑
=
+⋅+=
t
r
rt tyy
1
0 353.108796.0 ε  
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Non-UEMOA Region 
Ghana 
Identification: ttt εεy +0.8586-05585.0=Δ 14-)93.27((4.36)  
Solution: 
( )1321
1
0 8586.01414.005585.0 −−−
=
++++⋅++⋅+= ∑ ttttt
r
rt tyy εεεεε LL  
Liberia 
Identification: tttt εεyy +439.0+Δ354.0+0344.0=Δ 1-)50.1(2-)25.2()5853(.  
Solution: t
t
r
rt tyy εε ⋅−+⋅+= ∑
=
679.0228.20533.0
1
0  
Nigeria 
Identification: ttt εεy +2796.0+0813.0=Δ 4-)923.1()153.2(  
Solution: ( )3-2-1-
1=
0 +++.2796.0+2796.1+.0813.0+= ∑ ttttt
r
rt εεεεεtyy  
Sierra Leone 
Identification: ttt εεy +357.0-032.0=Δ 2-)48.2()97.1(  
Solution: ( )1
1
0 357.0643.0032.0 −
=
+⋅++⋅+= ∑ ttt
r
rt tyy εεε  
Note: Results derived using EVIEWS 6 Software. Absolute t-statistics are reported in the bracket. 
All the variables are significant at 5% level of significance. In all the equation Y0 refers to the log of real 
output for each of the individual countries for the base year 1960. t takes value 1 for the year 1963 and 
takes value 45 for the year 2007. 
 
The permanent and the temporary components can now be easily calculated using 
the solution to the above difference equations. For example, in case of Nigeria the 
permanent component of GDP is given as ∑
1=
0 2796.1+×0813.0+
t
r
rεty . 0y is the log 
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value of Nigeria’s GDP for the year 1960, and 451= Lt . The permanent component of 
the log output for Nigeria for the year 1963 is given as 19631960 2796.1+1×0813.+ εy
Nigeria . 
Similarly, the permanent of the log output for Nigeria for the year 1964 is given as 
)+(2796.1+2×0813.+ 196419631960 εεy
Nigeria . Repeating for each point in the data sets for 
Nigeria, starting 1963 and ending 2008, will yield the permanent component. We follow 
the same rule in calculating the permanent component of GDP for other countries. As one 
of the model specifications, that is, in case of Liberia involving an AR (2) process, we 
lose three initial observations (one due to differencing the data and the other related to 
AR(2) process). Since we want to examine cointegrating relation among permanent 
components of all the sample countries, t takes value 1 for the year 1963 and takes value 
45 for the year 2007, to address comparability.    
Once we have estimated the permanent component we can easily calculate the 
temporary component by subtracting permanent component from the actual data sets. As 
the GDP series for each country are expressed in natural log, the temporary and 
permanent component of GDP are also in natural log format. The permanent component 
and temporary components of log GDP are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 (in Appendix) 
respectively.  
In the final step we test for cointegration or presence of long term relationship 
among the permanent component of GDP and examine the correlation matrix of the 
temporary component of GDP across the member countries. Cointegration refers to a 
linear combination of nonstationary variables. Hence, we need to examine nonstationarity 
in the permanent component of GDP in their level form. Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests (ADF), we found evidence of nonstationarity in the permanent component of GDP 
for the sample countries. The data series can now be tested for cointegration. 
The identification of the cointegration between output is based on an unrestricted model 
(i.e. we will use a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model). There are ten I(1) process in the 
data, implying there can be, at most, nine cointegrating relations across ten countries 
(Johansen and Juselius, 1995). Results indicate on the basis of maximum eigenvalue and 
the trace tests at a 95 percent level of significance, there are three cointegrating 
relationship among the output variables (See Table 8).   
 
Table 8: Johansen Cointegration Test Results  
 
Null Hypothesisa 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
Eigenvalue 
  
5% Critical 
Value 
traceλ  tests                                                                           traceλ  value 
r = 0 r > 0 0.84 336.38 239.24 
r ≤  1 r > 1 0.80 256.28 197.37 
r ≤  2 r > 2 0.75 186.17 159.53 
r ≤  3 r > 3 0.57 127.23 125.62 
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r ≤  4 r > 4 0.49 91.16 95.75 
r ≤  5 r > 5 0.39 62.41 69.82 
r ≤  6 r > 6 0.34 41.00 47.86 
r ≤  7 r > 7 0.30 23.38 29.80 
r ≤  8 r > 8 0.17 8.11 15.49 
r ≤  9 r > 9 0.00 0.17 3.84 
maxλ  tests                                                                            maxλ value 
r = 0 r = 1 0.84 80.10 64.50 
r = 1 r = 2 0.80 70.11 58.43 
r = 2 r = 3 0.75 58.94 52.36 
r = 3 r = 4 0.57 36.06 46.23 
r = 4 r = 5 0.49 28.75 40.08 
r = 5 r = 6 0.39 21.41 33.88 
r = 6 r = 7 0.34 17.62 27.58 
r = 7 r = 8 0.30 15.27 21.13 
r = 8 r = 9 0.17 7.94 14.26 
r = 9 r = 10 0.00 0.17 3.84 
a r is the cointegrating rank. 
 
The relationship:  
0=837.0+449.0+0.547-268.0+
0.581-0.079-875.0+ 0.381-1.63-
)1215.0()094.0((0.092))044.0(
)099.0()019.0()886.0((0.118)(0.726)
TogoeSierraLeonSenegalNigeria
NigerLiberiaGhanaCoteoBurkinaFasBenin
yyyy
yyyyyy
              (3) 
where y is the permanent component of log output from restrictive countries. 6   The 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The cointegrating relationship (3) implies 
                                                 
6 The normalized cointigrating vector in this case is (1, -1.63, -0.381, 0.875, -0.079, -0.581, 0.268, -0.547, 
0.449, 0.837). 
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that the permanent components of GDP for these ten countries tend to move proportionally 
in the long term. The fact that there is co-movement in the permanent component of GDP 
is also seen graphically. Figure 1 suggests co-movement, implying a possible long-term 
relationship among the variables.    
 
 
Figure 1: Co-movement in the permanent component of GDP 
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Evidence of common trend is indicative of the fact that fluctuation in real output 
of the ten West African nations is synchronized. Such co-movements of outputs may be 
due to dependence on common factors, such as geographical proximity and similar trade 
composition of the West African nations.  
We extended this analysis of long-term association for the UEMOA and non-UEMOA 
group of nations. Interestingly, we figure out existence of one cointegrating relation 
among the supply side components of output for the UEMOA group of nations, whereas 
for the non-UEMOA group there is no such relation (Table11a and 11b in the Appendix). 
For the UEMOA group of economies the relation is:  
0=6095.0+0.1676+0.7266- 0.425-0.637-
)089.0((0.0426))0702.0((0.069)(0.043)
TogoSenegalNigerCoteoBurkinaFasBenin yyyyyy
  
The above relation suggests economies within UEMOA framework nations are 
more homogenous as compared with other ECOWAS nations belonging to non-UEMOA 
framework.  
Finally, we examined the correlation matrix of the temporary component of GDP 
(see Table 9) and found that little or no correlation in the temporary component of GDP. 
This corroborates the fact that the cyclical components of GDP across member countries 
are not related. Economic boom in one country does not necessarily suggest recession in 
other member countries. However, the permanent components of the GDP across 
member countries are highly correlated (see Table 10). From the above analysis a crucial 
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inference can be made. A common macroeconomic policy (a combination of monetary 
and fiscal policies) can be followed without any conflict of interest among the member 
countries. While fiscal policy can be used for development of infrastructure – an 
important component affecting long-term growth – monetary policy can be used for 
financing infrastructure and technology, factors affecting long-term growth potential. 
Because the permanent components of GDP are highly related with no relation among the 
temporary components, it can be concluded that in the long run there is a synchronized 
movement in output variables in among the ECOWAS nations, more specifically among 
the countries belonging to UEMOA region. 
 
Table 9: Correlation matrix of the temporary components of GDP 
  Benin Burkina 
Faso 
Cote 
d'Ivoire
Ghana Liberia Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra 
Leone
Togo
Benin 1.00          
Burkina 
Faso 
0.61 1.00         
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
-0.02 0.27 1.00        
Ghana 0.27 0.63 0.75 1.00       
Liberia -0.08 0.36 0.64 0.52 1.00      
Niger -0.03 0.25 0.73 0.61 0.59 1.00     
Nigeria -0.55 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.11 1.00    
Senegal -0.66 -0.35 -0.07 -0.19 0.22 0.11 0.35 1.00   
Sierra 
Leone 
0.49 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.20 -0.20 -0.51 -0.54 1.00  
Togo -0.01 0.27 0.99 0.74 0.65 0.72 0.07 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
 
 
Table 10: Correlation matrix of the permanent component of GDP 
 Benin Burkina 
Faso 
Cote 
d'Ivoire
Ghana Liberia Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra 
Leone 
Togo
Benin 1.00          
Burkina 
Faso 
0.99 1.00         
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
0.98 0.96 1.00        
Ghana 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.00       
Liberia 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.38 1.00      
Niger 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.56 1.00     
Nigeria 0.82 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.62 0.88 1.00    
Senegal 0.90 0.85 0.93 0.85 0.58 0.93 0.94 1.00   
Sierra 
Leone 
0.85 0.78 0.88 0.78 0.61 0.88 0.85 0.91 1.00  
Togo 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.46 0.95 0.84 0.91 0.85 1.00
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In addition, as is evident from Figure 2, ECOWAS countries (except for Ghana, Sierra 
Leone and Togo) have more or less similar inflation rates. Hence, conflicting issues 
resulting from loss of seignorage is also minimized. 7 
 
Figure 2: Inflation rates in the ECOWAS region 
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Source : World Development Indicators 2008, World Bank  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to determine to what extent countries in 
ECOWAS regions are ready to form an OCA. We found that the ECOWAS region, in 
general has got some desirable characteristics for forming an OCA. The preliminary 
inferences are supported well by our empirical results. To identify temporary and 
permanent components of output we used the Beveridge-Nelson methodology. In the 
paper we find existence of long term relationship in the trend or permanent component of 
output among the West African countries. This implies that a common monetary and 
fiscal policy may be appropriate for these nations. That is, forming an OCA in ECOWAS 
region would be expected to result in monetary and fiscal policy settings that would not 
create relative advantages or disadvantages between the member states. The results are 
more robust for the UEMOA group of countries. This group seems to be more 
homogenous in terms of their economic characteristics, and also tend to exhibit 
cointegrating relation in the permanent component of their output. 
                                                 
7 Seignorage is the revenue government obtains by financing its budget deficit through printing money 
rather than selling debt. This claim about minimum loss in seignorage is however not valid for high 
inflation countries, like, Ghana, Togo, and Sierra Leone. 
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However, these similarities in economic characteristics will not work in favor if 
some of the present problems in the ECOWAS region are not addressed. First, there is a 
need to build a proper infrastructure. There is a dearth of road and railway infrastructures. 
Secondly, the member countries should take more initiatives to trade among themselves 
rather than trading with more advanced economies. Many operating companies in the 
ECOWAS region are headquartered in developed countries. So when agreements are 
concluded among member countries of ECOWAS, the dominance of these trans-national 
corporations reduces such policy initiatives. Also, since most of the trade in the region 
involves primary commodities there is a need to diversify production into higher value 
added manufactured items. This might lead to possibility of intra-industry trade and 
sustain monopolistic type competition. Third, the success of integration in West Africa 
should be primary goal of all stakeholders therefore the ECOWAS must seek out areas of 
cooperation and not conflict with the UEMOA member countries. And finally, there 
should be some conscious effort by the relatively resource endowed economies in West 
Africa, such as, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire, to undertake more initiative 
to trade with relatively resource poor States in West Africa. At a time when direct 
transfer of resources sound rather implausible, trade can help to build purchasing power 
in the region.   
 
 
 21
References 
African Union Commission, (2008): KeyStats – Key Statistics on African Integration, 
Addis Ababa.  
Beveridge, S. and C. R. Nelson, (1981): “A New Approach to Decomposition of 
Economic Time Series into Permanent and Transitory Components with 
Particular Attention Towards Measurement of Business Cycles” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Volume 7, 151-174. 
Blanchard, O. and D. Quah, (1989): “The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and 
supply disturbances” American Economic Review, Volume 79, 655−673. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Fact Book, Available at: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, accessed on 14 
March 2009. 
ECOWAS Handbook of International Trade (2008): Available at: <https:// 
www.ecostat.org />, accessed on 14 March 2009. 
Feenstra, R. C. (1998): “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the 
Global Economy” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 12, 31–50. 
Goldberg, K., and N., Pavcnik (2004): “Trade, Inequality and Poverty: What Do We 
Know? Evidence from Recent Trade Liberalization Episodes in Developing 
Countries”, NBER Working Paper No. 10593. 
Johansen, S., and K., Juselius, (1995): “Identification of the Long-Run and the Short-Run 
Structure: An Application to the ISLM model,” Journal of Econometrics, Volume 
63, 7-36. 
Lumsdaine, R. L. and E. S. Prasad, (2002): “Identifying the common component of 
international economic fluctuations: A new approach” IZA Discussion Paper No. 
487, (IZA, Bonn).  
MacKinon, J., G., (1996): “Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Roots and 
Cointegration Test,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, Volume 11, 601-608. 
World Bank, (2008): World Development Indicators, Available at: 
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/>, accessed on 14 March 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Appendix 
Table 7: Permanent Component of GDP 
Year Benin Burkina 
Faso 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Ghana Liberia Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra 
Leone 
Togo 
1963 -1.42 -1.05 -0.35 0.23 -1.52 -0.84 1.47 -0.25 -1.11 -2.00 
1964 -1.35 -0.97 -0.11 0.28 -1.22 -0.61 1.54 -0.29 -1.06 -1.80 
1965 -1.29 -0.92 -0.18 0.34 -1.25 -0.61 1.60 -0.41 -1.07 -1.68 
1966 -1.25 -0.84 0.02 0.40 -1.21 -0.68 1.67 -0.37 -1.03 -1.50 
1967 -1.22 -0.77 0.09 0.45 -1.09 -0.68 1.40 -0.34 -1.08 -1.43 
1968 -1.15 -0.70 0.36 0.51 -1.02 -0.70 1.39 -0.21 -1.10 -1.37 
1969 -1.13 -0.61 0.40 0.58 -0.86 -0.63 1.68 -0.10 -0.98 -1.23 
1970 -1.11 -0.55 0.49 0.63 -0.83 -0.54 2.47 -0.08 -0.95 -1.32 
1971 -1.10 -0.48 0.62 0.70 -0.78 -0.45 2.15 0.05 -0.93 -1.12 
1972 -0.94 -0.41 0.85 0.77 -0.64 -0.12 2.53 0.39 -0.85 -0.91 
1973 -0.78 -0.35 1.26 0.84 -0.59 -0.10 2.71 0.38 -0.71 -0.69 
1974 -0.71 -0.30 1.45 0.90 -0.14 -0.08 3.12 0.61 -0.61 -0.30 
1975 -0.57 -0.23 1.74 0.94 0.00 -0.05 3.36 1.20 -0.53 -0.26 
1976 -0.50 -0.18 1.93 0.98 -0.11 0.24 3.60 1.32 -0.57 -0.27 
1977 -0.40 -0.10 2.31 1.04 0.14 0.62 3.53 1.33 -0.45 0.06 
1978 -0.23 0.00 2.55 1.10 0.20 0.74 3.44 1.51 -0.26 0.08 
1979 -0.02 0.07 2.69 1.16 0.37 0.95 3.70 1.80 -0.12 0.19 
1980 0.12 0.15 2.82 1.23 0.36 0.67 4.03 1.86 -0.05 0.51 
1981 0.09 0.20 2.53 1.26 0.25 0.67 3.95 1.67 0.00 0.23 
1982 0.13 0.25 2.49 1.31 0.34 0.53 3.74 1.52 0.12 0.09 
1983 0.09 0.31 2.43 1.37 0.23 0.29 3.22 1.02 -0.03 0.08 
1984 0.11 0.36 2.51 1.42 0.35 0.38 2.85 0.98 0.07 0.04 
1985 0.09 0.42 2.57 1.48 0.36 0.79 2.88 0.96 -0.14 0.16 
1986 0.28 0.52 3.00 1.57 0.34 0.89 2.50 1.10 -0.46 0.61 
1987 0.37 0.59 3.05 1.62 0.49 0.88 2.84 1.34 -0.31 0.74 
1988 0.40 0.66 3.06 1.67 0.60 0.83 2.91 1.31 -0.16 0.84 
1989 0.35 0.72 3.02 1.71 -0.08 1.06 2.96 1.14 -0.18 0.80 
1990 0.54 0.78 3.22 1.76 -1.40 0.90 3.29 1.17 -0.36 1.08 
1991 0.59 0.85 3.17 1.83 -0.79 0.98 3.14 1.09 -0.26 1.02 
1992 0.49 0.89 3.31 1.88 -1.45 0.42 3.35 1.37 -0.41 1.12 
1993 0.66 0.95 3.30 1.92 -1.80 0.59 2.79 1.39 -0.29 0.69 
1994 0.48 0.99 2.92 1.96 -1.70 0.84 2.83 1.11 -0.24 0.52 
1995 0.70 1.06 3.50 2.02 -1.41 0.85 3.09 1.56 -0.23 1.01 
1996 0.74 1.12 3.55 2.07 -0.98 0.74 3.33 1.65 -0.16 1.09 
1997 0.77 1.16 3.49 2.12 0.22 0.97 3.52 1.38 -0.22 1.10 
1998 0.77 1.22 3.67 2.18 0.02 0.87 3.35 1.33 -0.34 1.19 
1999 0.85 1.29 3.64 2.23 0.11 0.74 3.38 1.39 -0.38 1.18 
2000 0.82 1.35 3.41 2.25 0.47 0.92 3.67 1.36 -0.45 0.98 
2001 0.87 1.42 3.55 2.30 0.10 1.04 3.67 1.40 -0.31 1.06 
2002 0.99 1.50 3.70 2.36 0.17 1.30 3.99 1.64 -0.24 1.23 
2003 1.18 1.59 3.96 2.43 -0.50 1.35 4.15 1.86 -0.15 1.45 
2004 1.26 1.67 4.09 2.49 0.06 1.54 4.40 2.13 -0.08 1.62 
2005 1.31 1.73 4.15 2.57 0.40 1.60 4.72 2.51 0.03 1.65 
2006 1.40 1.78 4.24 2.64 0.51 1.80 4.97 2.26 0.16 1.70 
2007 1.57 1.85 4.43 2.70 0.75 2.02 5.08 2.52 0.31 1.87 
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Table 8: Temporary Component of GDP 
Benin Burkina 
Faso 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Ghana Liberia Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra 
Leone 
Togo 
0.04 0.11 0.07 0.20 -0.08 0.30 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.05
0.04 0.08 0.03 0.26 -0.22 0.07 0.17 0.23 0.07 0.01
0.05 0.05 0.09 0.38 -0.15 0.21 0.17 0.36 0.05 0.00
0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.35 -0.12 0.32 0.18 0.35 0.05 -0.04
0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.18 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.03 -0.03
0.04 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.18 0.26 0.26 0.25 -0.01 -0.05
0.02 -0.12 -0.09 0.09 -0.25 0.16 0.21 0.08 0.09 -0.09
0.01 -0.24 -0.12 0.16 -0.22 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.12 -0.06
0.00 -0.25 -0.17 0.19 -0.22 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.14
0.05 -0.13 -0.24 -0.01 -0.28 -0.18 -0.02 -0.15 0.09 -0.18
0.10 -0.04 -0.34 0.06 -0.27 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.16 -0.21
0.13 0.01 -0.33 0.17 -0.49 0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.17 -0.28
0.18 0.17 -0.38 0.09 -0.48 0.10 -0.03 -0.39 0.14 -0.22
0.14 0.15 -0.39 0.03 -0.32 -0.18 0.00 -0.50 0.05 -0.21
0.12 0.23 -0.48 0.12 -0.44 -0.36 0.05 -0.49 0.08 -0.31
0.16 0.39 -0.48 0.20 -0.41 -0.17 0.16 -0.55 0.22 -0.28
0.19 0.49 -0.48 0.23 -0.46 -0.20 0.16 -0.63 0.22 -0.31
0.22 0.50 -0.50 0.26 -0.41 0.25 0.14 -0.60 0.15 -0.39
0.17 0.38 -0.39 0.18 -0.32 0.11 0.14 -0.51 0.11 -0.27
0.11 0.31 -0.47 0.09 -0.39 0.17 0.16 -0.38 0.14 -0.29
0.00 0.16 -0.50 0.03 -0.33 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.02 -0.34
-0.06 0.02 -0.59 0.06 -0.41 0.00 0.49 0.01 0.01 -0.37
-0.05 0.02 -0.63 0.02 -0.43 -0.42 0.47 0.13 -0.02 -0.44
0.01 0.19 -0.78 0.17 -0.42 -0.25 0.50 0.33 -0.25 -0.55
0.07 0.27 -0.74 0.00 -0.52 -0.08 0.31 0.28 -0.05 -0.52
0.08 0.30 -0.74 -0.02 -0.57 -0.01 0.22 0.30 0.21 -0.52
0.06 0.25 -0.74 -0.05 -0.16 -0.28 0.21 0.45 0.11 -0.50
0.07 0.35 -0.85 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.06 0.57 -0.07 -0.59
0.04 0.30 -0.82 0.06 -0.26 -0.13 0.17 0.64 0.01 -0.54
-0.01 -0.08 -0.90 -0.02 -0.05 0.43 0.13 0.42 0.02 -0.59
0.09 -0.10 -0.90 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 0.27 0.34 0.03 -0.48
-0.08 -0.35 -0.81 -0.27 -0.32 -0.40 0.33 0.25 0.14 -0.54
0.00 -0.19 -1.11 -0.15 -0.59 -0.22 0.24 0.03 0.09 -0.74
0.06 -0.17 -1.06 -0.13 -0.85 -0.06 0.24 -0.03 0.10 -0.70
0.00 -0.27 -1.03 -0.19 -1.44 -0.36 0.07 0.16 0.06 -0.69
0.08 -0.19 -1.12 -0.17 -1.04 -0.14 0.12 0.29 -0.05 -0.73
0.02 -0.18 -1.11 -0.19 -0.92 -0.04 0.17 0.25 -0.03 -0.73
-0.01 -0.39 -1.06 -0.64 -1.05 -0.34 0.16 0.19 -0.01 -0.69
-0.01 -0.39 -1.19 -0.63 -0.71 -0.38 0.20 0.18 0.09 -0.78
0.04 -0.31 -1.26 -0.55 -0.75 -0.52 0.09 0.04 0.17 -0.84
0.09 -0.14 -1.34 -0.40 -0.39 -0.38 0.06 0.06 0.14 -0.88
0.14 -0.04 -1.35 -0.31 -0.83 -0.48 0.07 -0.05 0.15 -0.90
0.14 -0.04 -1.35 -0.20 -1.04 -0.40 0.00 -0.35 0.16 -0.88
0.13 -0.02 -1.39 -0.10 -1.00 -0.52 0.02 -0.03 0.19 -0.90
0.12 0.06 -1.45 0.02 -1.07 -0.59 0.03 -0.11 0.21 -0.95
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Table 11a: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for UEMOA countries 
Null 
Hypothesisa 
Alternate 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue λtrace value 
5% Critical 
value 
λtrace Test     
r = 0 r >0 0.74 110.79 95.75 
r <=1 r >1 0.43 52.88 69.82 
r <=2 r >2 0.25 28.65 47.86 
r <=3 r >3 0.18 16.20 29.80 
r <=4 r >4 0.15 7.48 15.49 
r <=5 r >5 0.01 0.38 3.84 
λmax Test   λmax Value  
r = 0 r = 1 0.74 57.91 40.08 
r = 1 r = 2 0.43 24.23 33.88 
r = 2 r = 3 0.25 12.46 27.58 
r = 3 r = 4 0.18 8.72 21.13 
r = 4 r = 5 0.15 7.10 14.26 
r = 5 r = 6 0.01 0.38 3.84 
  ar  is the cointegrating rank. 
  
 
Table 11b : Johansen Cointegration Test Results for non-UEMOA countries 
Null 
Hypothesisb Alternate Hypothesis Eigenvalue λtrace value 5% Critical value 
λtrace Test     
r = 0 r >0 0.30 36.42 47.86 
r <=1 r >1 0.29 20.82 29.80 
r <=2 r >2 0.13 6.11 15.49 
r <=3 r >3 0.00 0.06 3.84 
λmax Test   λmax Value  
r = 0 r = 1 0.30 15.60 27.58 
r = 1 r = 2 0.29 14.70 21.13 
r = 2 r = 3 0.13 6.06 14.26 
r = 3 r = 4 0.00 0.06 3.84 
 br is the cointegrating rank 
 
